In the case of Abira Medical Laboratories, LLC v. Freedom Life Insurance Co., No. 2:24-CV-02110-JHS (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2025 Slomsky, J.), the Eastern District Federal Court of Pennsylvania, addressed a question of first impression and held that a foreign insurance company who did not consent to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, simply based on the fact that the carrier obtained a Certificate of Authority issued pursuant to 40 Pa. C.S.A. § 46 in order to conduct business in Pennsylvania.
Defendant is a foreign insurance company that holds a Certificate of Authority issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance, authorizing it to conduct insurance business in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff is a licensed medical testing laboratory that performs clinical laboratory, pharmacy, genetics, addiction rehabilitation, and COVID-19 testing services at its facilities located in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff provides these laboratory testing services to Defendant's insured members, among others, as an out-of-network provider.
When the Plaintiff had a billing dispute with the insurance company regarding services performed, the Plaintiff sued the Defendant in a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. The Defendant carrier removed the action to federal court on the basis of diversity and then filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Defendant carrier asserted, in part, that the court lacked personal jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction over the insurance company.
The Plaintiff argued that the Defendant carrier had consented to general personal jurisdiction on any claim because the Defendant had applied for and received a Certificate of Authority to do insurance business in Pennsylvania pursuant to 40 Pa. C.S.A. § 46. Plaintiff relies on United States Supreme Court decisions Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917) and Mallory v. Norfolk S. Railway Co., 600 U.S. 122 (2023). But because the Missouri statute at issue in Pennsylvania Fire and § 411, the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Mallory, differ from § 46 in one key aspect, namely the scope of jurisdiction provided for in each statute, Plaintiff's reliance on these cases to support its argument that Defendant consented to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania is misplaced. Unlike the defendants in Pennsylvania Fire and Mallory that agreed to be subject to suit in Missouri and Pennsylvania on any claim, Defendant has only consented to suit in Pennsylvania on claims arising out of a violation of § 46 brought by or on behalf of the Insurance Commissioner.
The court noted that, under the plain language of § 46 foreign insurance companies wishing to conduct business in Pennsylvania must obtain a Certificate of Authority from Pennsylvania’s Department of Insurance. The statute further provides that, upon obtaining a Certificate of Authority, § 46 allows for any action arising out of a violation of § 46 that is instituted by or on behalf of the insurance commissioner to be brought against the foreign insurance company in Pennsylvania.
Here, given that the current action was not commenced by the insurance commissioner arising out of a violation of § 46, but rather was an action brought by a private party, the grant of jurisdiction provided under § 46 over a foreign insurance company was not implicated.
The court also held that the Defendant insurance company had not otherwise consented to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. Defendant is not registered to do business in Pennsylvania under § 411. As such, Defendant has only appointed an agent in Pennsylvania, who is "the Secretary of the Commonwealth and his successor or successors in office," to accept service of process for the limited types of claims permitted to be brought against it by § 46.
Given that the Court found that it lacked general personal jurisdiction, as well as specific personal jurisdiction over the Defendant insurance company, the Court granted the carrier’s Motion to Dismiss.